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Summary  findings
One legacy  of central planning,  says  lPleskovic,  is that tlie  (through  the budget)  ftor  thiC  debts of nonviab,e
finaticial  systems  in thc transitional  economics  are even  entcrprises  in a transparent  manner and for the
less  developed  than  in many developing countries.  He  rccapit-lization of banks after thcir clea.-  up. Otherwise
contends  that the main  goal of financial  reformn  ir thcsc  thc hcalthy  segmcnts  of the commercial  sc-tors will have
economies  should be to make  passive  financial  systems  to carry  the burden of financial  restructuring,  which  wil!
active  - to make financial  systems  participate  activ-  ly in  slow  dowin  th  transition.
the economy,  as they do in mnarket  economies.  Farly in thic  transitiorl,  atten.tion  must also be paid to
ror this to happen,  the  .ransitional  economlics  must  improving  the system  of payments,  dernonopolizing
develop  banking  systen;s  that allocate  credit cfficiently.  banking,  changing  the structurc  of ovwnership  (including
Commercial  banks  must screen  borrowers  and monitor  privatization),  and intioducing  niarket-based  financial
and discipline  enterprises.  The role of the government  or  legislation.
the central  bank should be limited  to rcgulation  and  The speed of financial  reform wili depend greatly  on
supervision.  the availability  of skilled  banking professionals,  on access
Most transitional  economies  have adopted a gradual  to technical  assistance  from abroad, fiscal  constraints,
approach to reforming  their financial  systems,  and of course  on specific  country  circumstances.  For
msAintaining  the banking  system's  passive  role. But  example.  for most countries  of the former Soviet  Union
banking  reform in Eastern  Europe  cannot wait for  --  cxcept for the Baltic  states  - a prerequisite  to
enterprise  restructuring  and privatization,  because  both  successful  financial  restructuring  is macroeconomic
banks  and state enterpriser  are burdened  with inherited  stabilization  and the reduction  of high inflation  rates.
bad debts that endanger  their solvency  and hence  that of  The most important lesson  from countries  further
the economy.  alomn  in reform  is that financial  reform should not be
The financial  restructuring  of banks  and enterprises  dela,'ed but should start as soon as possible.  Delays
should be undertaken  simultaneously,  says  P1!  skovic,  and  rcrducc  living  standards  (burdening  the healthy  parts of
should start carly in the transition. Commercial  banks  the 2conomv  with direct taxes or high financial  costs),
should play  an active  role in the financial  restructuring  of  discourage  small-scale  critreprencirs, inhibit  the entry  of
entcrprises.  Governments  must take responsibility  mnew  firms,  an(; cause  the economy  to stagnate further.
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larger  effort  in the Bank  to investigatc  the transition  of economies  of Fastern  Europe  and the former  Soviet  Union.  Copies  of
the paper are available  free  from  the World  Bank,  1818  H Street  NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please  contact  Mani  Jandu,
room  N9-037,  extension  33103  (28  pages).  January  1994.
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The fall of communism  throughout  Eastern  Europe  and the former  Soviet  Union  created
widespread  hopes  for a rapid  transition  to political  democracy  and market  economies. Most
of the early public  and professional  debate  focused  on macroeconomic  stabilization  and
privatization.  Financial  policies  and banking  reform  received  much  less attention,  partly
because  macroeconomic  stabilization  was considered  a priority,  partly  because  the subject  is
hard for the general  public  to understand,  and partly  because  the institutions  of Eastem
Europe  have  been  studied  less than other  aspects  of economics.  In addition,  financial  reform
exposes  a number  of unresolved  issues  -- the resolution  of bad debts,  corporate  finance,  and
governance  in transition  -- that were not extensively  analyzed  at the beginning  of the
transition  process  (Fischer  1990;  Fischer  and Gelb 1990).
With benefit  of three years  of experience,  it is has become  clear that financial
institutions  and instruments  play a critical  role in the rapid  growth  of the new  private  sector
and the privatidzation  of large  enterprises. It is also  clear that the reform  process  may take
longer  than  expected. Without  access  to adequate  credit,  investment  capital,  and convertible
currency,  few entrepreneurs  can start sound,  sizable  businesses.  This situation  also makes  it
difficult  to change  large state  enterprises  into profitable  private  firms.
Experience  with  the stabilization  process  in Eastern  Europe  suggests  that the financial
and banking  sectors  are one of the weakest  links in Jhe  institudonal  infrastructure  of these
economies  (Bruno  1992). Because  of the legacy  of central  planning,  the financial  systems  in
these  countries  are even  less developed  than in many  developing  countries.
2Besides  slowing  the transition  to market  economies,  underdeveloped  financial  systems
undermine  political  demo'racy. Problems  such  as lack  of credit for the new  private  sector,
banking  scandals,  financial  legislation  inconsistent  with  market  principles,  negative  interest
rates, and high  inflation  affect  living  standards  and generate  popular  discontent,  as can be
seen  in several  Eastern  European  countries  and the former  Soviet  Union.
This paper reviews  several  issues  Ehat  are important  for reforming  the financial  sector
in transitional  economies  and provides  direction  for the future. It includes  an overview  of
the legacy  of the communist  financial  system  and recent  developments.  It also discusses
some  political  aspects  of the financial  reforms  and recent  approaches  and problems  facing
many  trar.sitional  economies.
Legacy  of the Communist  Financial  System
In many  ir,dustrialized  countries  the central  bank  is responsible  for executing  monetary
policies  and for regulating  and supervising  commercial  banks. Commercial  banks  and other
financial  intermediaries  provide  services  that enhance  economic  growth  and efficiency,  such
as mobilizing  savings,  screening  and monitoring  borrowers,  providing  and facilitating
payment  transactions,  and providing  insurance  and risk management.  Many  western  nations
have  experienced  problems  in their financial  sectors  in the last  two decades  (World
Deveiopment  Report  1989),  but problems  in the transition  economies  are on a much  larger
scale.
3Financial systems in socialist  economies  lack such basic functions  as an efficient
payment mechanismr,  financial  intermediation  between households  and businesses,
government regulation  and supervision  (including  deposit  insurance), and information  on
creditworthiness. In the past, the socialist  economies  relied on a monobank  system
subordinated  to the central planning agencies. Comapetition  was virtually nonexistent  and is
still limited.  For these transitional  economies  to achieve a banking system compatible with a
moden rnarket  economy, replacement,  rather than reform, is necessary.
In a market economy money  is used as a unit of account, a means of payment, and a
store of value. In a socialist wconomy,  however, its uses are restricted (Aslund 1992). For
example, in the former Soviet Union there was no single generally  acceptable means of
payment. Money was separated into two isolated markets. Households  received cash as
wages  and payments for goods, while the enterprises' account money (non-cash)  could be
used only among enterprises. Cash deposits  made by enterprises could not be legally
withdrawn  in cash, except to pay wages (Lipton and Sachs 1992). The banking system did
not allow depositors to withdraw cash -- the most basic function in a market economy.
These practices continue ill most states of the former Soviet Union.
In contrast to the fractional-reserve  system of market economies, in which the central
bank executes monetary policy through  such instruments  as open market operations, the
socialist econom,es  attempted to control monetary  and credit policies directly.  Instead  of
-sing  discount rates, selling government  securities, or changing the reserve requirements  of
commercial  banks to reduce or stimulate  demand for credit and investment  and to control
4inflation  and economic  growth, the Soviet central bank simply revised investment  credits to
bring them in line with the investment  spending  targets dictated by central planning.
Thus the Soviet banking system was essentially  an extension  of the government
(Chumachenko  1993). There was no real commercial  banking system as understood  in the
West and private banking was prohibited. The state bank and its subsidiaries  held a
monopoly  and were subordinated  to the central government. The state bank acted both as a
central banker, monitoring  monetary  and credit aggregates, and as a commercial  bank
network, providing enterprises with working and investment  capital and offering ir.dividual
savings accounts.
Household  savings were used for housing loans, while surpluses  were passed to the
central bank for allocation  to enterprises according to centrally determined  production
targets.  The banks did not evaluate or monitor the enterprises' performance  or
creditworthiness,  and losses were routinely covered by the state budget.  Each enterprise was
assigned a branch of the monobank,  so there was no competition  among the banks -- just as
there was no competition  among suppliers throughout  the economy (Balcerowicz  1993).
Firms were not concerned  with profitability,  interest rates, or creditworthiness,  thus
monetary and credit policies did not play an independent  role.  Banking functions  were
passive, limited to accounting  supervision  to ensure that firms were fulfilling  their plans.
Interest rates were typically  low or negative for both deposits  and loans.
Hungary, Poland, and Yugoslavia  had other financial  institutions  including foreign
trade banks, savings banks, and cooperative  banks for farmers.  Although they had some
5independence  in serving the needs of highly specialized  clients, ultimately  they were
subordinated  to the monobank.
Financial  acs..ounting  standards in socialist  economies  did not conform to principles of
a market economy and there was no independent  auditing  of banks and enterprises. The
legislation  concerning  central and commercial  banking activities and enterprises was
generally inconsistent  with market economy  principles, and the system of payments was
inefficient.
Although the central planning mechanism  performed relatively well in the early stages
of development  by emphasizing  heavy and basin industries, it started to break down when
economies  became more diversified. Widespread  shortages of consumer  goods, repressed
inflation, low quality goods and services, and long queues became common.
In the 1970s  some Eastern European countries began experimenting  with limited
market reforms by introducing  several changes in their banking systems to improve the
allocation  of resources and accelerate  economic  growth.  In 1971, Yugoslavia  was the first to
break up the monobank  into a central bank and commercial  banks.  The central banking
system consisted  of the National Bank of Yugoslavia  and a regional branch located in each of
the eight republics.  The New Economic  Mechanism  introduced in Hungary in 1968
increased the influence  of market forces and of financia!  dnd banking instruments  on
enterprise behavior.  In 1987, Hungary broke up the Hungarian  National Bank into five
commercial state-owned  banks.  In the same year the Soviet Gosbank was split into a central
bank and agricultural, industrial, and savings banks (Conway 1993).  Poland created nine
6commercial  banks by breaking up its monobank  system in 1989. Numerous regional banks
were created in Bulgaria in 1987, and two regional banks in Czechoslovalda  in 1990.
Although these changes were important,  'they were insufficient  to adequately  impreve
the allocation of resources and address the problems of indebtedness,  lack of financial
discipline,  and inflation. In most ':ansition  economies  the banks are still owned by the
central bank, the state or the enterprises themselves. In the former Yugoslavia  commercial
banks are owned by social (self-managed)  enterprises. In Bulgarih, Hungary, and the former
Soviet Union state enterprises still own a substantial  part of bank shares.  Competition  is still
restncred because of regional  or functional  specialization. For example, nine commercial
banks in Poland are regionally  based, and there are regional banking monopolies  in the
former Yugoslavia. In Hungary the barnks  were divided along sectoral lines.  Ukraine
recently introduced  regional bank monopolies  owned by state enterprises and local
govemment (Pleskovic 1993).
The economic  reform programs introduced  in Yugoslavia  (1989), Poland (1990),
Czechoslovakia  (1991), and Russia (1992) included  additional  reforms in the banking sector.
For the first time the banking system was involved  not only in monetary policy but also in
serving the private sector.  These reforms covered the liberalization  (" interest rates, the
ittroduction of bankruotcy  procedures, the privatization  of banks, and new banking and
financial  legislation following  the universal  banking model.
Although some banking reforms have been introduced  in all the t-ansition economies,
these changes have not yet produced  a more efficient allocation  of resources.  Unresolved
and difficult problems  remain, including inefficient  payment systems, deteriorating  bank
7portfolios (bad debts, interenterprise  credits), lack of competition,  inappropriate  ownership
structures, and inadequaie mechanisms  for regulation  and supervision.
Political Aspects of Financial Reforms
In addition to the well-recognized  economic  problems, the slow pac; of financial  refoi  i in
transition economies  creates political  difficulties. These range from banking scandals to the
slow development  of the private sector because of limited credit availability. For example,
the first president of the Polish centra! bank was removed in 1991 in the wake of scandals  in
the financial system (Slay 1992), and a series of regioral financial  scandals have created
resentment  among Polish voters.  Applebaum  (1993) reports that the word "thieves" was
scrawled on election posters put up by free-market  parties in the last election.  In Hungary,
forty-two investigations  of bank corruption cases are under way (RFE 1993).
Monetary  policy is generally  used to control inflation  in Western economies.  In the
former Soviet Union lack of appropriate institutional  arrangements  and other fiscal and
monetary  difficjlties have led to very h.gh inflation. High inflation, more than any other
factor (Sachs 1993a),  has demoralized  Russian society  and put the overall reform program --
and democracy -- at risk.  In Russia and the Ukraine, inflation  is running  at 20 to 30 percent
a month, caujsing  widespread  distress.  Because inflation  was repressed in the past, the
population  has little experience with the hyperinflation  well known in post-war Germany  or
Japan.  Inflation  is destructive in a way that is hard to diagnose. Consequently,  people
blame the reform process, rather than the legacy of inappropriate  fiscal and monetary policy.
8Negative interest rates on household  deposits and enormous spreads betweeai  deposit
and lending rates are another source of dissatisfaction. Negative interest rates reduce living
standards through inflation and discourage savings. Lower savings translate into lower
investment  and weak economic  growt,a. Because  few alternative  assets are availabie,
households  spend valuable time and pa. high premiums to purchase foreign  currency as a
hedge against inflation. Such currency is usually  held at home and earns no interest.  For
example, in 1993 the only savings bank in Russia, Sberbank,  offered 40 percent annual
interest 'ates on demand deposits, while inflation  was more than 400 percent (Caprio and
Levine 1993). In Belarus, Ge:rgia, and Kazakhstan  the savings bank plays a central role in
mobilizing  household  deposits, and interest rates on both deposits and loans are sharply
negative (Conway 1993).  Because  of the lack of competition  in banklng, household  savings
are channelled  to less productive  uses, such as currency speculation  and other ways to avoid
the costs of inflation. These policies have lowered living standards and eroded the value of
pensions  and savings, raising public dissatisfaction  with reform policies.
The most damaging political effect of the financial  crisis .s the lack of adequate  credit
for the emerging private sector.  Small private entrepreneurs  and employees  represent the
future middle class whose support is essential for the rapid development  of c. mocratic
institutions  and free market economies. Without  private sector development,  democratization
will be slowed, political and econ3mic  reforms will be reversed, azwd  populist politicians will
advance.
The current financial  system in these countries  discriminates  against the private
sector.  The state- or enterprise-owned  banks inherited a large portfolio of bad loans.  For
9the moment, the bankdng  system continues  to subsidize  economically  nonviable firms,
because of soft budget constraints. This burden puts increasing  stress on public finances.
Because of the lack of bankruptcy  procedures  and appropriate legislation, little action can :)e
taken against defauling state enterprises. Moreover, banks with a large share of
nonperformiing  loans have often continued lending to bad enterprises in an attempt to turn
nonperforming  loans into "good" ones and to avoid provisioning  for their bad loans.  Banks
have tried to increase their income by engaging in more risky lenwing  by widening  the spread
between lending and deposit rates.  The result is that bad loans have crowded out loans to
viable new enterprises, misalloca.ing  capital and increasing  the cost of credit.  Commercial
banks have also invested heavily in govemment  securities to lover the risk and incrf;ase  their
liquidity. In this way household  savings have been used to firz,ce  the fiscal deficit instead
of business investment.
Crowding out the private sector in favor of loans to state enterprises has occurred in
countries  even further along in the reform process. For example  in Poland, only about 526
(out of several hundred thousand) small and medium-size  firms were liquidated  during 1990
and 1991, but no large state firms or state-owned  banks went bankrupt during that time (Slay
1992). In 1989 the growing private sector received  only 2.7 percent of total credit (Lipton
and Sachs 1990). At the end of 1990 the private sector accounted  for about half of total
einployment  in Poland, but received less than one-sixth  of domestic credit (Eastwood  and
Durski 1992). Nine commercial  banks were responsible for more than 90 percent of the
commercial  credit in early 1992, of which about 90 percent went to state enterprises.
Similarly, in Bulgaria, credit has been withheld  from the sectors that should receive more
10funds, while govemment and public enterprises, the sectors that should be adjusting, have
benefitted from the credit 'xpansion (Thorne 1992). In Slovenia, the commercial  bank
(which had a monopoly)  charged real interest rates of 20 to 30 percent in 1992, a orohibitive
rate for new private enterprises (Pleskovic  and Sachs 1994). In the Czech Republic net
borrowing by enterprises declined from 6.4 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1991
to 2.9 percent in 1992 and Hungarian  firms borrowed 1.6 percent of GDP in 1991, but
became net repayers to banks in 1992 (The Economist  1993).
Policymakers  and economists  in Eastern Europe focus on the large state-owned
enterprises, rather than on the development  of a new middle class of small- and medium-
sized business (Kornai 1990). Ways need to be found to provide such firms with credit and
to remove remaining  legal barriers.
Because of the shortage of skilled  commercial  bankers, banks in most of the
transitional  countries are still dominated  by representatives  of the old system, who have little
experience in commercial  banking.  Credits go to public enterprises on an ad hoc or political
basis through an informal supply network. The new private sector firms are t xcluded from
these networks. This situation will likely endure as long as property rights are still in flux
and most banks -re in the public sector.
Regulation  of the financial  sector is not yet consistent  with the principles of a market
economy, because of tiumerous  loopholes  in the legal system. The lack of financial
discipline, prudential regulaticn, and supervision  breeds fraud and abuse, which undermine
public confidence. To turn this situation  around, regulatory  and supervisory  mechanisms  and
corresponding  financial  institutions  must be developed  and enforced.
11Recent Approaches and Problems In the Reform of the Flnancial Sector
Early in the reform process, it was believed that a western-type  stock market would mobilize
capital.  Stock exchanges  were established  in most Eastern European countries and in Russia,
but have since foundered  because of institutional  barriers, lack of appropriate legislation,
inexperience,  and the slowness  of privatization. They presently have a very limited role, and
access to capital and credit is still dominated  by the large domestic or foreign commercial
banks (Lampe 1992).
In most countries, banks will remain the major source of extemal funding  for new
enterprises.  New financial  intermediaries  - mutual funds, private pension funds, and
insurance companies  -- are needed to complement  the commercial  banking system, but will
develop slowly.  At this stage in the transition,  banks represent almost the entire financial
system in these economies. The need for fundamental  reforms of the bankdng  sector is
pressing.  Commercial banks are burdened  with large portfolios of nonperforming  loans and
many banks and large state enterprises in these economies  are technically  insolvent  by
international  accounting  standards. Until restructuring  of banks and enterprises takes place,
retained earnings may have to play larger than expected roles in enterprise financing.
Several problems  must be addressed to enlarge the scope of socialist  banking systems.
The most important issues to be resolved are competition  and ownership, financial
restructuring  (including  privatization), improvement  in the payment system, and regulation
and supervision. Although all of these changes can be introduced  simultaneously,  financial
restructuring  of banks and enterprises should receive top priority.
12Competltlon  and Ownership
COMPETITION.  Competition  is essential  to market economies.  Competition  in financial
markets holds down transaction  costs, allocates  risk to those most willing to bear it, and soes
that investment  is carried out by those with the most promising  opportunities  (World
Development  Report 1989).
In most transition economies  very large banks coexist with very small ones.  In
Bulgaria the three largest banks hold most of the country's assets, deposits, and capital,
while the 67 smaller banks hold a very small share (Thorne i992).  In Romania, the Czech
Republic, and Slovakia, a few large banks account for more than 60 percent of commercial
lending. In Russia and Romania the major savings bank holds over 90 percent of household
deposits.  With no competing  alternatives  people cannot hope to obtain a higher return on
their savings, which is usually negative. Slovenia merged its two largest commercial  banks
in late 1990 into a monopoly  bank that co)ntrolled  more than 90 percent of the domestic
market, while 30 smaller banks had less than a 10 percent share.  The management  at that
time explained that a large monopoly  bank would improve efficiency. However, efficiency
deteriorated because of the lack of financial  discipline  and ever-higher losses of social
enterprises. Three years later, when the bank was close to insolvency,  they sought to
reverse the situation  by breaking up the monopoly.
Another problem is that commercial  banks in these countries are highly specialized
either by region, sector or activity. In most cases foreign trade banks, savings banks, and
cooperatives are both highly concentrated  and separate from the commercial  banking system.
13In Poland the nine new commercial  banks were given loan portfolios  of enterprises along
regional lines, limiting the ability of enterprises and households  to choose among competing
banks.  The initial break up of the monopoly  banking system in Slovenia  resulted in several
regional banks without  branches.
Such high concentration  of bank activity creates several problems.  It reduces
competition  among existing banks and postpones  improvements  in bank efficiency.
Competition  promotes  efficiency  because it lowers costs and creates opportunities  for
enterprises to discover empty niches in the financial  market (Stiglitz 1993).  It is importai.
for competition  to reach all regions and sectors, to allow households  and enterprises a free
choice.  Regional  or sectoral specialization  of banks prevents such a choice.
Restructuring  the banking sector to promote competition  and contestability  depends on
the country's particular circumstances. For example, following  the universal  banking model,
governments  may choose to break up monopolistic  savings banks and integrate  their branches
into commercial  banks (Gelb and Gray 1991). In countries where one or two large banks
dominate the domestic market but where numerous small banks also exist, it may be
necessary to break up the major commercial  bank, and merge some small ones to create
larger banks.  It is important  to allow new banks to open branches across the country to
prevent regional monopolies.
Competition  and contestability  can also be encouraged by adopting  anti-monopoly
legislation,  licensing, and auditing  procedures, and by establishing  necessary regulatory  and
supervisory  agencies.  Bank reorganization  typically  requires a high degree of managerial
supervision  for several years after the reorganization  (Caprio and Levine 1993). Because of
14an acute shortage of bank managers  and supervisors  in these countries, the number of newly
created banks must not exceed the capacity of the institutions  that supervise  and implement
the restructuring  process.  It might be necessary  to raise capital requirements  to prevent the
proliferation  of very small banks and to encourage mergers of an appropriate and efficient
size.  As Caprio and Summers (1993) note, limiting the number  of banks through an increase
in capital requirements  is one way to increase  the franchise  value of bank licenses and to
encourage  prudent and more efficient bank management.
Foreign banks can also be used to improve competition. Stiglitz (1989) finds that
when one or two banks dominate  domestic banking, restrictions  on foreign banks may serve
to protect the monopoly  rents of those banks.  Since the domestic  banking sector in most
transition  economies  is far from competitive,  some form of foreign banking may improve the
allocation  of capital.  Foreign banks can also transfer experience  and skills to improve the
quality of financial  services and to train local bankers.  If, however, foreign banks are given
access to the market while existing banks carry a large portfolio of nonperforming  loans and
cannot compete, governments  must closely regulate and supervise  the sector to prevent
foreign  banks from "creaming"  the market.
OWNERSHIP.  Most banks in transition  economies, with the exception  of new private
banks, are owned directly or indirectly by the government  through the ownership of state
enterprises. The existing ownership pattem creates a conflict of interest, because it does not
separate lenders and borrowers.
isCentral  bank  ownership  of commercial  banks  and the close  association  between  the
central  bank  and state-  or enterprise-owned  banks  hampers  the effectiveness  of monetary
policies  and banking  supervision,  as experienced  by Slovenia. Moreover,  state  ownership  of
the banking  system  interferes  with the allocation  of credit,  and in the absence  of appropriate
regulation,  distorts  managerial  incentives.
When  a few large enterprises  control  the majority  of the banking  sector,  bank lenoing
is biased  toward  those  enterprises. Control  of credit  by enterprises  can also be used to
preserve  the high  profit margins  of monopolistic  enterprises  and to discourage  enterprise
competition.  In the former  Yugoslavia  enterprise  ownership  of banks  led to a distinct
conflict  of interest  between  creditor  and borrower  and resulted  in such  serious  consequences
as insolvency  (Pleskovic  and Sachs  1994). Enterprise  managers  also served  on the banks'
board  of directors. Over time,  regional  banking  monopolies  developed,  and directors  of
social  enterprises  restricted  the autonomy  of the banks  in the allocation  of credit. When
these  enterprises  incurred  losses,  banks  had limited  means  to exert financial  discipline  -- and
their  portfolios  worsened. This system  has led to an inadequate  capital  structure,  a large
share  of nonperforming  loans,  and a large spread  between  deposit  and lending  rates. Many
enterprises  cannot  service  their rapidly  accumulated  debts,  and a number  of banks  are close
to insolvency.
Despite  such  negative  experiences,  many  state-owned  enterprises  in Eastern  Europe,
the former  Soviet  Union,  and Ukraine  (Popov  1993)  have  created  new banks. Government
policies  should  aim to discontinue  bank ownership  by enterprises  to speed  the restructuring
and privatization  process  and to prevent  a conflict  of interest.
16Financial Restructuring
Financial  restructuring  of commercial  banks and enterprises is one of the most difficult tasks
facing transition economies  -- a task made even harder because many state-owned  enterprises
are losing money  and cannot repay their debt without  new bank credits.  In most cases these
enterprises cannot be closed because of their importance  to the overall economy.  Closure
would create social problems  and raise unemployment  to a level that could not be supported
by the government,  given the inherited socialist welfare system.  Similarly, nonviable banks
cannot be closed down because of their size.  Because  the comrmercial  banks in' erited many
non-performing  assets (bad debts), their portfolio reflects the state of the enterprises sector.
The value of these portfolios  is difficult to evaluate because of a deep recession and the loss
of traditional  markets.
There are few easy solutions  to these problems. Debts of state enterprises cannot  just
be written off, because as long as enterprises and banks are not privatized, the bad debt
problem will reappear, as in the former Yugoslavia  and Romania (Clifton and Khan 1993).
On the other hand, if banks are put under a hard budget constraint  or privatized before they
are cleaned up and adequately  recapitalized,  they may transfer the burden through high
spreads to good enterprises or perhaps shut down illiquid (but solvent) companies.' Levine
and Scott (1993) suggest maintaining  the inherited obligations  and assets on balance sheets up
to privatization. The remaining  enterprise obligations  would be written off at the time of
privatization  and government  securities would be issued to banks for the remaining  value of
17loan assets.  This policy might work best in countries where the banking reforms are least
advanced.
Another view holds that in the early stages of transition  all finance should be provided
through retained earnings and equity because of inherited risk, moral hazard, and insufficient
regulation and supervision  (McKinnon  1991). Government  should  postpone the privati-Ition
of the banking system until restructuring  in the real sectors is complete. The problem with
this approach, however, is that it leaves the banking system to restructure itself through very
high real interest rates, which would be p'ohibitive for the new private sector and would
prolong the transition process.
The most commonly  recommended  policy options are debt cancellation  and debt
socialization. Debt cancellation  assumes that removing  debt will eliminate  previous problems
and leave the net worth of the government  unchanged, since both banks and enterprises are
owned by the state.  Debt socialization  keeps debt obligations  on the firms' books, but moves
the bad assets off the commercial  banks' balance sheets to another institution, such as a 'bad
debt" bank (Bonin  and Mitchell 1992). This policy, like debt cancellation, lowers the book
value of the commercial  bank's assets and requires the issue of government securities to
recapitalize  the banks.
Eastern European countries, with the exception  of the Czech Republic  and Slovenia,
have not adopted debt cancellation. The Czech Republic  and Slovenia socialized  a portion of
the debt by creating specialized  (bad debt bank) institutions. Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria
chose a third option: decentralized  bank manageinent. According  to this policy, provisions
against bad loans are accumulated  to meet capital requirements. Banks are encouraged  to
18obtain repayment, either through  debt workouts  or through bankruptcy  procedures.  This
policy assumes that commercial  banks have sufficient  information  to determine the viability
of their debtors and that this strategy will lower the fiscal burden.  This policy could force
profitable  companies  to carry the burden of restructuring  through higher costs of bank
services.  A model developed  by Bonin and Mitchell (1992) which contrasts debt cancellation
and decentralized  bank management  policies shows that under reasonable  assumptions of
capital-market  imperfections,  canceling  inherited debt does not necessarily  preserve the net
worth of government assets.  The managers may, however, be able to appropriate substantial
assets through spontaneous  privatization  after the debt has been canceled.
A still different approach was proposed for Bulgaria by Thorne (1993).  One group of
banks would be privatized quickly and would lend only to private enterprises.  The remaining
banks would continue under state control and would be responsible for restructuring
unprofitable  state enterprises.  This solution  was proposed to encourage  development  of new
private enterprises by providing them easy access to credit.  A potential  problem with this
policy is that the incentives  guiding  the managers  of the private banks would differ
substantially  from those of the state banks, causing difficulties in regulation and supervision.
Although  approaches  differ from country to country, success depends  on the
availability  of sidlls and on circumstances. Countries  with advanced banking  and enterprise
reforms can better distinguish  between good and bad debts and exert more financial  discipline
on banks and enterprises.
In general, the experience in Eastern Europe shows that financial  restructuring  should
start early and that both banking reforms and restructuring (e.g., strengthening  supervision
19and payments, debt classification  and workouts)  and enterprise restructuring should take
place simultaneously. 2 Because  the problems  of indebtedness  in banks and enterprises are
connected, financial  restructuring  should include generalized  debt-equity  swaps between
banks and heavily indebted enterprises to reduce the cash flow devoted to debt service
payments. 3 Such a program should  divide enterprises into three categories: those to be
restructured and subsequently  privatized, those to be closed down, and those (public utilities)
to be regulated  (Pleskovic  and Sachs 1994). The debts of heavily indebted  enterprises should
be reduced before or as a part of privatization. For the enterprises to be closed down a clear
timetable  should be drawn, and explicit subsidies  provided to reduce employment  gradually
when immediate  closure is not feasible.  For the remaining  public enterprises and utilities,
the government should establish  regulations, and restructure these enterprises into
commercial  public services.  These measures  should help reduce the burden of enterprise
debts on the bank's portfolios  and speed privatization. Bank  portfolios should be cleared up
before their privatization,  and government  securities should be issued to recapitalize  banks.
Commercial  banks should be involved  in the process of enterprise classification,
restructuring, and supervision.
Long-term  solutions  to financial  restructuring  of banks and enterprises depend on the
progress of economic  reform, including macroeconomic  stabilization,  trade reorientation, and
privatization. Special attention  should be paid to providing small private enterprises with
access to credit.  It may be necessary  for the government to encourage  the establishment  of
financial  institutions  to service small private businesses  and to introduce  temporary quotas for
commercial  banks to lend to the private sector.
20Systems of Payment
The system of payments in most transitional  economies  is inefficient. In Russia it takes
several weeks to clear checks between banks in Moscow  and several months to clear checks
from a bank outside of Moscow  (Lipton and Sachs 1992). Inefficient  payment mechanisms
led to the breakdown  of the settlement  process among the banks, resulting in long delays in
clearing of payments  and a spread of illiquidity  to otherwise  healthy enterprises (Sachs
1993b). In Bulgaria, the use of cash by individuals  and enterprises as the primary means of
payment led to the accumulation  of large unsettled balances  between banks (Thome 1993).
The underdeveloped  payment system was responsible  for abuses in the former Yugoslavia
and Poland, where a slow interbank check clearing system undermined  confidence in the
financial system.
An efficient system of payments -- the backbone  of a market economy -- should be a
top priority for central banks in transitional  economies. Whether organized by private or
public institutions, the goal should be to clear checks in a few days and thereby instill public
confidence  in economic  transactions.
Concluding Remarks
The major goal in reforming the financial  system in transitional  economies  should be to
change it from a passive to an active participant  -- the role it plays in market economies.
The banking system must, above all, allocate  credit efficiently. Commercial banks should
21screen borrowers and monitor and discipline  enterprises; the government  or central bank
should regulate and supervise only.
Most transitional  economies  have adopted a gradual approach to reform of their
financial  system, maintaining  a passive banking role.  But Eastern Europe banking reform
cannot wait for enterprise restructuring  and privatization,  because both state enterprises and
banks are burdened  with inherited bad debts that endanger their solvency  and the economic
situation as a whole.  Financial  restructuring  of banks and enterprises should be undertakin
simultaneously,  starting early in the transition process.  Commercial  banks should play an
active role in the financial  restructuring  of enterprises. Government  budgets will have to
cover no,-viable  enterprises debts in a transparent manner and fund recapitalization  of banks
after clean up.  Otherwise  the healthy commercial  sectors will have to carry the burden of
financial  restructuring, which will slow the process of transition. In addition to restructuring,
improvements  in the system of payments, demonopolization  of banking, changes in
ownership structure (including  privatization),  and the introduction  and implementation  of
market-based  financial  legislation  need to be addressed early.
The speed of the financial  reform in transition  economies  will depend  greatly on the
availability  of skilled banking  professionals, on access to technical  assistance from abroad,
fiscal constraints, and of course on specific  country circumstances. For most countries of the
former Soviet Union, for example -- except for the Baldc states -- a prerequisite  to successful
financial  restructuring  is macroeconomic  stabilization  and the reduction of high inflation
rates.
22The most  important  lesson  learned  from countries  that are further  along  in the reform
process  is that financial  restructuring  should  start as soon  as possible. Delays  reduce  living
standards  (burdening  the healthy  parts of the economy  with  direct taxes  or higher  financial
costs), discourage  small-scale  entrepreneurs,  inhibit  entry  of new firms, and cause the
economy  to stagnate  further.
23Noe
1.  Cornsequences  of covering bank losses with high spreads on new loans are discussed in
the World Development  Report 1989.
2.  Recapitali 4;ation is an important  part of financial  restructuring. However, ther  are also
many other elements of financial  restructuring  that are critical.  For example, the experience
of Slovenia shows that it is important to establish  early in the process a Bank Restructuring
Agency  and Enterprise  Restructuring  Agency  to deal with the classification  of enterprises and
their debts, workout of bad loa.s.  partial recapitalization  of banks and enterprises and other
issues of restructuring.
3.  Since bad debt means bad equity, as noted by Caprio and Levine (1993), only viable
debts should be included.
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